Introduction
The London Stock Exchange is a vibrant capital market which attracts issuers from all over the world, bringing companies with diverse corporate governance practices and norms into the UK listed landscape. The dominant mode of corporate governance in UK public companies has historically been dispersed ownership.
1 However, during the last decade or so, the UK Listing regime has found itself addressing unfamiliar governance issues arising at companies with a concentrated ownership structure. Such companies have typically originated from the natural resources/mining sectors of various developing economies, and initially appealed to investors due to their strong growth prospects. 2 Unfortunately, a series of high profile scandals at Bumi (now renamed Asia Mineral Resources), Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (now de-listed) and Essar Energy, have tarnished the reputation of such foreign listings and led the UK Listing Authority (the Financial Conduct Authority) to introduce new corporate governance standards as part of its Listing Regime for companies with controlling shareholders (thereafter 'The Enhanced Listing Regime'). The new rules came into force in May 2014. 3 The Enhanced Listing Regime is essentially a measure of minority shareholder protection. It introduces several prescriptive corporate governance standards to protect minority shareholders in blockholder-controlled companies. These standards are novel in nature compared to the corporate governance standards that have been developed thus far in the UK and in other key listing regimes.
Minority shareholder protections are important to listing regimes due the importance of legal and regulatory frameworks to economic and financial development. Although the
A. Examining the Enhanced Listing Regime within the UK Minority Shareholder Protection Framework

The Framework for Minority Shareholder Protection in the UK
Company law and securities regulation address different aspects of minority investor protection on listed markets. Minority shareholder protection regimes appear to be highly valued by investors, although work remains to be done in establishing their causal significance -whether in relation to corporate performance, investment portfolio performance, and at a broader level, market and economic development. 8 Although majority shareholder rule is widely seen as a legitimate basis for the exercise of power in the democracy of corporate capitalism, 'the tyranny of the majority' is a potential concern. Controlling shareholders are potentially able to expropriate resources from minority shareholders via a variety of mechanisms, most of which stem from their ability to control the appointment of the board of directors and pass resolutions at General Meetings.
These mechanisms can, for example, take the form of appointing or rewarding senior managers on the basis of family rather than meritocratic considerations or influencing company strategy in a way that promotes blockholders' personal idiosyncratic objectives. More egregiously, the controlling shareholder can use their position of influence to facilitate related party transactions, asset stripping or outright theft from the company. These 'private benefits of control' are generally achieved at the expense of the net wealth of minority shareholders, and allow blockholders to benefit disproportionately from their control of a majority (or significant minority) of the voting shares of the entity.
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In the UK, minority shareholder protection had humble beginnings 10 in company law. Even today, the disadvantage of being in the minority can only be countervailed by law to a modest extent. Minority shareholder protection became more developed in the 1980s, 11 with the rise of securities regulation. 12 Corporate transparency is a key objective of securities regulation and continued to be emphasised in the 1990s, although minority interests were also promoted via more prescriptive corporate governance standards. 13 Securities regulation took off as part of European legal harmonisation in the 2000s, 14 further advancing corporate transparency and anti-market abuse as measures of investor protection.
In mapping out the landscape for minority shareholder protection in the UK, Chiu 15 has argued that minority shareholder remedies based on company law rights, such as the derivative action and unfair prejudice petition, are framed in such a way that can rarely be used by minority shareholders in the capital markets. 16 More substantive minority shareholder protection is increasingly found in securities regulation. However, corporate transparency promoted by securities regulation only supports minority shareholder protection in the sense of informing shareholder trading and exit strategies. In the UK, it does not adequately offer significant opportunities for investor power to be exercised through private securities litigation. Hence, minority protection based on securities litigation can largely been seen as 'law in the books' but not in action due to procedural barriers in civil justice and the collective action problem. 17 However, as part of a 'soft law' component of securities regulation, the UK Listing Rules have, since the 1990s, maintained a requirement that listed companies in the highest listing category of the LSE should comply with the provisions of the prevailing Code of Corporate Governance or else explain any deviations. The Code describes best practices in corporate governance -particularly in relation to the structure, composition and functioning of the board of directors and its committees. Adherence to the Code is intended to provide minority investors with an adequate ex ante level of protection through the mechanism of an effective board which takes account of the interests of all shareholders (including minority interests) in the direction of the company. The current UK Code has evolved since 13 Cadbury Report, below. 16 This is because there are procedural barriers to overcome in the derivative action, such as showing a prima facie case and the court needs to be convinced at the preliminary stage of approving the action that the action would be in the interests of the company's long-term success. This is difficult as litigation generally has negative effects on share price and could be disruptive for the company. On the unfair prejudice action, courts have interpreted this action to be available largely to shareholders in closely knit private companies due to equitable and justice issues. Where companies are widely held and shareholders do not have significant personal stakes in their relations with each other, the availability of the action is highly limited to corporate constitutional issues only. See O'Neill v Phillips [1999] UKHL 24.
the first Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance and is often seen as a leading standard 18 in the advancement of the 'soft law' approach to corporate governance. Premium-listed companies 19 are subject to it on a comply-or-explain basis, meaning that companies are urged to comply, but are free to provide explanations in their annual reports if they deviate from the Code's provisions (although they must always comply with its principles).
The Corporate Governance Code has a quasi-mandatory character as part of the securities regulation framework. The obligation to comply or explain means that the Code is notcontrary to popular perceptions -an entirely voluntary or self-regulatory mechanism; Premium-listed companies have no choice but to engage with the Code. Nonetheless, it reflects an investment culture that is 'negotiated' 20 -bottom-up and dialogic in nature. The
Code maintains a delicate balance in soft law between increasingly prescriptive corporate governance standards preferred by the buy-side 21 and support for flexibility in governance policies 22 favoured by the issuer community. In 2011, Bumi plc, which evolved from a Jersey incorporated investment vehicle (Valar plc) founded by Nathaniel Rothschild was floated on the LSE. Valar Plc was originally a cash shell, attracting investment from institutional investors largely on the basis of the reputation of Rothschild and his business partners, and only afterwards became engaged in mining activities after Rothschild decided to invest the company's assets in two Indonesian mining companies. Bumi plc was block-held, featuring two Indonesian companies that in combination owned the majority stake. Rothschild, who owned a minority stake of about 7%, then fell out with his co-shareholders, the influential Bakrie family of Indonesia, over allegations of misappropriation of moneys by the latter of up to £1bn and financial statement misrepresentations.
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The Bakrie family then tried to remove Rothschild from the Board and dilute his stake, but Rothschild alleged abuse of minority rights and unsuccessfully attempted a coup to seize control of the Board. Ultimately, in early 2013, in the face of highly critical scrutiny from the UK media and a plummeting share price (to around one-fifth of its IPO valuation), the Bakrie family agreed to sell their stake to an Indonesian businessman (Samin Tan) In the face of unrelenting public exposure and criticism 39 , ENRC decided to take the company private and proposed to buy out the 18% free float of shares on the LSE. The buyout offer was criticised by independent board members to be at a significant undervalue. However in August 2013, most of the minority shareholders had accepted the offer which was worth only about 45% of the original float price. The company then delisted from the LSE on 28 October 2013.
Another unfortunate episode unfolded in early 2014 at Essar Energy, 40 an Indian resources company listed on the LSE in April 2010. The company was 78% controlled by an investment vehicle owned by Indian billionaires, the Ruia family. Essar began to suffer major losses for a variety of reasons, including a high debt burden and setbacks in energy permit negotiations with the Indian Government. 41 The share price lost almost 75% of its IPO valuation, at which point the blockholder decided to take the company private. The minority shareholders were made a buyout offer at the prevailing low market valuation. Both the minority shareholders, which included UK institutions and insurance companies, and a special committee of Essar Energy's own independent directors criticised the opportunistic buyout offer and appealed to the blockholder to respect the interests of minority shareholders as well as those of the majority. However, in the face of an uncompromising attitude from the blockholder, both saw little choice other than to accept in view of imminent delisting.
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The experiences of Bumi, ENRC and Essar Energy highlighted to investors that minority expropriation 43 and lack of external accountability are side effects that may be associated with the concentrated ownership model. The sheer unfamiliarity of the UK equity market with blockholder-controlled entities also added to a widespread public perception that concentrated ownership was synonymous with 'weak' governance. However, it is by no means obvious from empirical studies that concentrated ownership , per se, is systematically associated with inferior corporate performance. 44 Many commentators have convincingly argued the blockholder model may, in the right institutional context, promote 39 One of the ejected directors, Ken Olisa, famously described the culture at ENRC as "more Soviet than City".
'ENRC "Soviet-style" control accusation denied', Financial Times (14 June 2011). However, in a blockholder-controlled company, major shareholders are in a position to directly impose their governance preferences. Although any non-compliance with the Code must still be explained to the market, there is much less scope to force such companies to engage with those minority shareholders that are not supportive of the chosen governance framework. The Code is hence potentially a much less effective ex ante minority protection mechanism in blockholder-controlled companies.
We do not perceive, however, that the episodes discussed above have significantly tarnished the more general brand of the UK Corporate Governance Code. The Enhanced Listing Regime is framed separately from the Code and focused on a relatively small segment of the listed market. This demarcated approach permits regulators to avoid confronting the wider question of whether soft law is adequate for promoting good governance across the market as a whole. Nonetheless, we speculate that increased prescription in corporate governance is a developing trend which is already making a major impact on financial sector governance 51 . Over time, the Enhanced Listing Regime may come to be seen as part of a wider trend towards more binding and prescriptive corporate governance standards in UK listed equity.
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We nevertheless raise doubts as to whether the Enhanced Listing Regime adequately deals with some specific governance issues that have emerged in blockholder-controlled issuers. Furthermore, we are concerned that this new regime may be underpinned by a lack of insight into the more positive aspects of blockholder ownership revealed in various other successful economies.
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The first key component of the Enhanced Listing Regime is that, if a Premium-listed company has a controlling shareholder, 54 the controlling shareholder must enter into a mandatory agreement 55 with the company. This agreement is intended to regulate the blockholder's influence over the company, ensure that the company's constitution does not undermine the position of minority shareholders and preserves the 'independence' of the business. The aim is to limit the extent of private benefit that can be extracted by controlling shareholders as well as mitigate the lack of accountability to minority shareholders.
Business 'independence' is defined in broad terms, meaning that the company is not overly reliant on conducting business with the controlling shareholder or on access to the controlling shareholder for financing. The business must have strategic control over its assets, business strategy and ability to earn revenue. Independence from the controlling shareholder means that all commercial transactions and arrangements conducted with the controlling shareholder have to be at arm's length and on normal commercial terms. The . 52 The nature of corporate governance standards reflects the strength of minority shareholder protection regimes and the issue of whether such standards should be regarded as 'law' or 'soft law' could be of great practical importance.
53 e.g. in continental Europe and many fast growing Asian markets.
54 defined as a shareholder with control of at least 30% of the voting shares.
55 Listing Rules 6.1.4ff. It is not necessary that every controlling shareholder enters into a separate agreement.
controlling shareholder must also agree to not to take any step that would circumvent the Listing Rules.
If a Premium-listed company fails to put in place a mandatory agreement, or fails to comply with the independence terms, or if an independent director on the Board is of the view that the agreement is not complied with, then minority independent shareholders are given extra monitoring powers to veto all related-party transactions. 56 However, the threat of delisting is not used as an enforcement mechanism -otherwise minority independent shareholders would be further punished by being cut off from any ability to sell their equity stake.
A second key aspect of the Enhanced Listing Regime introduces a re-ordering of voting rights under certain circumstances. This aims to give more weight to minority shareholders' voice than would ordinarily be the case in the General Meeting. In particular, independent minority shareholders are provided with additional voice when appointing independent directors or when a cancellation of the Premium listing is proposed. Their approval by majority is sought as a class instead of being subsumed under the General Meeting, although in the case of electing independent directors, a protest vote of independent shareholders can only temporarily delay the majority decision for a period of 90 days.
An earlier proposal to compel boards of blockholder-controlled companies to appoint a majority of independent directors was ultimately dropped from the final rules. The Listing Authority was persuaded to refrain from over-prescription on boardroom composition at the behest of the UK issuer community, although there was significant buy-side support for the introduction of a mandatory requirement for a majority of independent directors. 57 We now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the key measures.
Re-ordering Voting Powers in Favour of the Minority and Consistency with Company Law
As described above, the Enhanced Listing Regime requires approval of minority independent shareholders voting as a class in two situations: election of independent directors and where a cancellation of the Premium listing is sought.
The former is particularly important to minority shareholders. Independent directors are potentially well-placed to address some of the main governance problems that have arisen in blockholder-controlled issuers, such as lack of external transparency, abuse of relatedparty transactions, weaknesses in internal control systems and non-compliance with anticorruption and bribery legislation. The privileged position of independent directors as company 'insiders', with influence over decision-making, can potentially act as a significant check on the blockholder's power. Minority shareholders therefore have a strong interest in securing the appointment of robust and capable independent directors to the board.
Can such re-ordering of voting rights be supported in company law? The company law framework regulates the exercise of majority power in general meetings subject to the standard of 'reasonable hypothetical shareholder acting bona fides in the interest of the company as a whole'. 58 Case law jurisprudence recognises that where a majority stake exists, the exercise of such powers could be adverse to the minority's interests, particularly in the context of constitutional amendments. However, courts have refrained from interfering excessively with voting powers exercised at general meetings. 59 In Australia, courts can prevent the successful exercise of majority power if unfairly oppressive consequences result for minority shareholders. 60 Such position has not been followed in the UK. 61 The policy position in the UK, at least before the passage of the Companies Act 2006, seemed to be reluctant to upset the private proprietary rights attached to shareholdings.
It could be argued that UK courts have largely upheld the power of the majority vote because there are specific minority shareholder remedies in company law, 62 which render it inappropriate for courts to achieve minority protection through a tampering with the exercise of voting powers. But the unfair prejudice petition for minority shareholders 63 is rarely utilised in the context of listed companies as judicial interpretation of 'unfair prejudice' has made its application much more pertinent to closely-held private companies. 64 Further, derivative litigation has been rare 65 and is unlikely to be easily utilised given the procedural barriers in the legal framework. 66 Given that one of the most attractive features in UK minority shareholder protection is respect for minority shareholder voice, the re-ordering of voting rights in the Enhanced Listing Regime can be viewed as broadly consistent with the facilitative nature of company law. Although the Regime prima facie distorts the balance of voting power in the general meeting, the over-weighting of minority voting rights in specified circumstances is arguably necessary to provide them with the capacity to exercise their voice and participatory rights under company law.
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Further, legislative tinkering with voting powers is not new. Section 239 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that ratification of directors' breaches of duty can be achieved by a majority vote in the general meeting, provided that interested shareholders' votes are ignored. This form of legislative intrusion under-weights the voting power of the relevant shareholder but preserves the integrity of the ratification process. Such re-ordering of voting rights also achieves the internalisation of companies' management affairs and minimises the externalisation of irregularities onto public arenas such as courts. One could view the Enhanced Listing Regime in a similar way, i.e. providing a facilitative framework for minority voice to be heard.
Mukwiri and Siems 68 have argued for caution in protecting minority shareholders by increases in voting power, for fear of the adverse incentives such changes in power dynamics may introduce for management bodies. They advocate protection of minority shareholders without resorting to increases in voting power, such as through greater transparency.
For example, a 'middle way' of enhancing shareholder voice without tinkering with voting powers could be achieved by empowering minority shareholders to request more information. Information request rights could further be supported by a right to obtain an injunction against proceeding with a course of action still subject to explanation to minority shareholders, similar to the kind of injunction a shareholder may obtain to restrain directors from constitutional breaches. 69 However, 'middle way' rights designed to enhance minority voice may be regarded as weak because abusive behaviour may not be prevented although it could subsequently be discovered. Besides, the ethos of facilitating shareholder voice would support ex ante rights such as the re-ordering of voting rights instead of relying on ex post remedies. In relation to enhancing minority voting power where a cancellation of the Premium listing is concerned, we are of the view that the Enhanced Listing Regime does not adequately address the problem of disadvantageous minority buyouts. On the face of it, the new rules allow minority shareholders to block any proposal to cancel a Premium listing. Their approval needs to be sought as a class, and the general meeting must on the whole approve the cancellation by a special majority of 75%. However, the majority vote of minority independent shareholders can be dispensed with in a takeover situation if another corporate entity succeeds in acquiring 80% of the voting power or more.
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This technique was utilised to de-list Essar Energy from the LSE in June 2014. 71 The controlling family already owned 78% of Essar Energy. The family used an unlisted corporate entity under their control 72 to launch a hostile takeover for Essar Energy and acquire another 2% from minority shareholders. At that point, the Board of Essar Energy -including its independent directors -conceded that the threshold had been passed for the controlling blockholders to delist and reluctantly recommended that remaining minority shareholders should accept the buyout offer.
Essar Energy's success in buying out the minority shareholders was also due in part to the low free float of the company's shares -at the time of its IPO, Essar obtained a waiver in respect of the normal minimum 25% free float requirement (on the basis that the market liquidity of the shares was sufficiently high). Although we agree that significantly raising the minimum free float requirement, an option mooted at consultation but rejected by the FCA 73 , would have been an undesirable way of protecting minority voice, regulators would be well advised to ensure that waivers from existing free float requirements are applied only sparingly in the future.
Mandatory Agreement and Consistency with Corporate Governance Standards
The Mandatory Relationship Agreement 74 (MRA) required by the Enhanced Listing Regime is a measure that seeks to pre-commit controlling shareholders to the 'independence' of the business and the importance of minority voice. As a key minority fear lies in the risks of tunnelling and misappropriations by the controlling block-holder, it can be argued that the 70 Once that has been achieved, no further approval/acceptances by independent shareholders are required to cancel the Premium listing and take the company private.
71 'Essar Energy panel backs Ruia family's take-private offer', Financial Times (13 May 2014).
72 Essar Global Fund Limited. 73 The minimum free float of 25% is consistent with the NYSE and SEHK studied in this article and higher than several other jurisdictions including Singapore Stock Exchange which requires only a minimum 10% free float. 74 The terminology 'relationship agreement' has subsisted under the final consultation CP13/15, and has changed to 'mandatory agreement' in the final Policy Statement PS14/18. mandatory independence provisions in the MRA will keep related-party transactions and arrangements under check. The MRA is principally monitored by independent directors, whose signalling of non-compliance will trigger minority veto rights to related-party transactions, however small.
We raise several concerns with respect to this new measure. A first is that such independence provisions could ultimately limit the benefits that a controlling blockholder brings to the company albeit mitigating some of the risks.
Corporate governance standards in the UK have been developed with the primary objective of overseeing and controlling the undue personal agendas that corporate management may pursue. Hence the structures of independent directors, board committees and shareholder engagement have been institutionalised to monitor those in control. The MRA is introduced within the same ethos in relation to preserving the independence of the business, in this case with respect to controlling shareholders rather than management.
However, the nature of the blockholder's influence over a company is arguably different from that of a CEO or top manager. The blockholder's stake in a company will generally comprise of a larger personal financial commitment, a firm-specific stake in terms of skills and innovation and possibly an emotional stake based on founding, family or other personal attachment. These factors may play a powerful role in aligning the blockholder's motivation with the long-term success of the company. 75 In contrast, the professional manager's stake is likely to be largely financial and more short-term. Academic literature points to the difficulties in designing executive remuneration to motivate towards long term performance.
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The nature of the founding block-holder/controller's relationship to a company was emphasized by Ken Moelis in a recent high profile market listing. The Moelis IPO 77 highlighted the founder shareholder's fears that minority activist shareholders such as hedge funds could divert the attention of the company for short termist purposes and disrupt the blockholder's long term vision. shareholders or if it is merely acceding to the special interests of institutional investors with negative implications for the success of the company as a whole.
A second possible concern is that the MRA is an agreement entered into between controlling shareholders (defined widely and including associates of controlling shareholders) and the company. Minority shareholders are not privy to those agreements. The MRA is neither strictly speaking a constitutional document as it does not bind all members of the company, neither is it a private shareholders' agreement. There is a need to critically analyse the nature of the MRA and its implications for minority shareholder protection.
As minority independent shareholders are not privy to the MRA, they do not have a right to enforce it. In fact there would appear to represent a lacuna in enforcement as the company in such a scenario would be in the hands of the blockholder. Further, minority shareholders may not be able to take derivative actions against the blockholder as a breach of the MRA may not be regarded as a breach of directors' duties.
78
The Enhanced Listing Regime addresses these problems by increasing monitoring rights for minority shareholders in blockholder-controlled companies. It empowers them to veto any related-party transactions in the event of a breach. Such a breach would invariably be determined by independent directors, as the opinion of an independent director, even if contrary to the Board, would trigger the minority veto rights. Hence, it is arguable that the agreement between the controlling blockholder and company would in fact be 'enforced' by minority independent shareholders on behalf of the company. This puts minority independent shareholders in a representative capacity for the company.
One wonders if acting in a representative capacity for the company may trigger fiduciary duties owed to the company in the specific context of preserving the independence of the business. Can the preservation of the independence of the business be equivalent to the wider duty under section 172 to promote the long term success of the company for the benefit of all members as a whole? Could the actions of the minority independent shareholders be subject to judicial scrutiny and claims by the blockholders? It may be argued that where minority veto rights are triggered under the MRA, they are not exercised as a matter of minority voice but as representative voice in the company's interests. It is important to consider the implications for minority shareholders in terms of obligations if such rights are triggered.
Further, where independent directors determine a breach, there seems to be no further option for internal remediation. Minority veto rights are triggered right away. This would accord with the above observations that minority independent shareholders are acting in a representative capacity, as required by the Enhanced Listing Regime, to preserve the independence of the business, and not in a personal capacity. Could a non-severe breach of the independence requirement be dealt with by ratification by minority independent shareholders instead? This would minimise the polarisation of positions in the general meeting and would facilitate dialogue. Structuring the MRA in such a way as to leave out minority shareholders as party may not be optimal and conducive to realising minority voice.
If minority shareholders are included in the MRA, then the MRA would likely become a constitutional document, falling within the definition of an agreement under section 29(d) of the Companies Act, arguably forming part of the company's constitution. Constitutional status would boost the rights and voice of minority independent shareholders as enforcement of the MRA could be carried out as personal rights 79 or under the unfair prejudice petition. If so, it is possible to view the MRA as providing superior protection for minority shareholders where there is a controlling blockholder as compared to companies without a controlling blockholder. The Listing Rules would be providing safeguards in 'business independence' for minority shareholders in a block-held company, while minority shareholders facing other agency problems in widely-held companies are not provided with specific protection in terms of business conduct. Such constitutional status could boost the rights of minority independent shareholders to the point of over-correction.
The MRA's ambivalent nature may reflect its experimental and tentative position on special minority protection in block-held companies. It is a suis generis document that neither falls within the ambit of the company's constitution nor the contractual framework relating to shareholders' agreements (which could make the Listing Authority seem as if a framework has been put in place a framework to facilitate direct showdowns between controlling blockholders and minority independent shareholders). So we remain uncertain if minority protection is the exercise of a personal right or a representative right, the former being a more powerful tool whether it is constitutionally or contractually based. The latter interpretation may result in more burdens being imposed on minority independent shareholders. The uncertainties surrounding the obligations of independent directors and minority independent shareholders in enforcing the MRA could result in the cosmetic implementation of the MRA and a lack of enforcement.
A final concern is that the introduction of the MRA may generate the perception that the UK views blockholder-controlled companies negatively and this could make the LSE less attractive to international issuers. In March 2014, Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group (JLT) became the first Premium listed company to seek the Listing Authority's permission to downgrade to a Standard Listing in anticipation of avoiding the Enhanced Listing Regime.
Hong Kong, and has always had a history of insisting upon insider control and resisting compliance with best practices in corporate governance such as having independent directors on the Board. The Jardine Group is however well-known for taking a long term view over a range of carefully selected diversified businesses and has delivered consistent returns to minority investors.
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The JLT move can be viewed as suis generis. The Jardine Group has always jealously guarded its insider control, to the extent that it delisted 4 of its companies from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1994 and relisted in Singapore due to a breakdown in its negotiations with the Securities and Futures Commission, to be exempt from the takeover regime in Hong Kong.
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It remains to be seen whether JLT's actions are representative of wider market sentiment.
B. Minority Shareholder Protection in the US Listing Regime
This Section will focus on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as the premier listing destination in the US. Although the trio of the NYSE, Nasdaq and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) dominate the listed market in the US, the NYSE's historical significance and reputational standing makes it an apt comparative subject for the LSE. In 2012, it was recorded that 80% of Fortune 500 companies were NYSE-listed companies. 112 (a) the transaction in which the shares with different voting rights are to be issued has been approved by two-thirds of all shares entitled to vote on the proposition; (b) the issuer had a majority of independent directors at the time the matter was voted upon and a majority of such directors approved the proposal; if the issuer had less than a majority of such directors, then all independent directors approved; (c) the ratio of voting differential per share is no more than one to ten; and (d) the rights of the holders of the two classes of common stock are substantially the same except for voting power per share. should not assume all of the responsibility for the current state of the minority protection regime. They are subject to the intervention of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in respect of approving, amending or adding to listing rules, to which we now turn.
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The SEC was created in 1934 as part of the New Deal in response to an acute need for investor protection on securities markets. 118 The main regulatory methodology adopted by the SEC was securities disclosure at initial public offers and in continuing obligations. La Porta el al have argued that SEC regulation and civil enforcement are central to the investor appeal of US securities markets. 119 Further, Coffee opines that SEC enforcement is an attractive factor for investors who find comfort in the SEC-policed framework for investor protection. 120 A number of commentators have also argued that the brand of stringent securities regulation in the US appeals to investors, motivating firms to cross-list on US stock exchanges if they wish to achieve bonding with those standards. such high investor-protection standards are likely to be rewarded with better market valuation and a broader investor base. However, a number of commentators also point out that the demand for cross-listings in the US could also primarily be due to the depth and liquidity of its capital markets.
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In light of the weaknesses of state company law, securities regulation is arguably a major part of the minority shareholder protection landscape in the US. The viability of civil enforcement allows aggrieved investors to seek compensation for disclosure failings or market abuse such as insider dealing. A significant proportion of the minority shareholder protection available to investors in the US is realised through private securities litigation. The corporate governance standards maintained by the NYSE tend to be premised upon combating the agency problems arising from a potential misuse of power by professional management, and rely largely upon mandating a significant oversight and monitoring role 136 Section 951, and the relevant SEC release provides that such a vote would be conducted not less frequently than once in every 3 years. 137 Section 954. for independent board members. 144 These independence requirements are possibly the most stringent in the world, at least compared to the other two listed markets studied in this article.
However, several of the NYSE corporate governance standards do not apply if a listed company is block-held to 50% or more. 145 These are: the requirement to have a majority of independent directors on the Board and to create nominating and compensation committees comprising only of independent directors. This is an interesting limitation of the reach of governance regulation. Perhaps the NYSE regards independent representation on the Board as being less relevant to blockholder-dominated enterprises? It is nonetheless a potential source of concern for minority shareholders in such companies.
The NYSE Listing Rules do not provide many safeguards for minority shareholders of listed companies that feature dual-class voting or concentrated ownership. The Listing Rules contain general principles to prohibit conflicts of interest, misappropriation of corporate opportunities 146 and director/officer share transactions surrounding corporate communications. 147 Related-party transactions do not require shareholder voting except where they are issues of securities to the effect of increasing voting power by at least one per cent. 148 These transactions may be effected after scrutiny by the audit committee.
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The NYSE Listing Rules however attempt to ameliorate the disadvantage of holding nonvoting shares in a dual-class structure by prohibiting such shares from further being differentiated in terms of entitlements compared to the other classes of listed shares.
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Further, the Listing rules spell out a number of protections for preferred shareholders. Preferred shareholders would have a right to nominate two directors if six defaults of dividend occur that are not compensated for. 151 Preferred shareholders would also be able to vote as a class on new issues of the same security or if a more senior issue is proposed (in which case, a two-third majority is needed for approval preferred stock class is also required to pass any proposed charter or by-law amendments that affect the class.
153
Given the traditional US context of corporate resistance towards increasing shareholder rights, 154 it is perhaps not surprising that the NYSE Listing Rules do not feature many specific shareholder protections, particularly in relation to companies with a dual-class voting structure. That said, empirical research 155 in the US shows that many companies featuring dual-class voting structures have voluntarily put in place mechanisms such as increased independent Board representation to assuage minority concerns. Further, the concerns of minority shareholders may also be mitigated to an extent where the listed market is supported by a landscape of good security analyst coverage.
In sum, securities regulation and its influence upon the corporate governance standards of stock exchange listing rules, along with associated investor litigation possibilities, lie at the core of the investor protection regime in the US. 156 However, specific standards that address governance issues in blockholder-controlled companies are relatively absent. Furthermore, the NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX are distinctive in our global comparison of listing regimes in allowing dual-class voting structures which could in principle give rise to minority protection concerns. 157 What explains this regulatory status quo? We tentatively suggest that the pro-management perspective underlying legislative frameworks in company law, along with the continued prevalence of dispersed ownership in most listed companies, continues to incline investors and regulators towards a focus on the agency problem of over-powerful management, and not towards issues that pertain to the governance of blockholder-controlled companies. Furthermore, the unparalleled commercial success of leading US technology companies, despite (or perhaps because of) their unconventional governance structures, has legitimised a shift away from a regulatory regime that protects minority shareholders in the blockholder context. Controlling insiders have carried out tunnelling or minority expropriation, such as diversion of company assets to other companies in the group, favourable transactions with related parties or other transactions to extract private benefit. 163 A common practice has been to undermine minority rights by dilution when rights offerings are carried out at deep discounts. 164 At state-owned H-share issuers, the state as controlling insider has hurt minorities by imposing political or socio-economic agendas on the company, such as propping up other ailing state-owned companies or asset-stripping. Such issuers have also been subject to embezzlement by corrupt officers given the weak public governance in China. 165 However, other commentators have pointed out the benefits of blockholder-controlled companies. Family-owned and controlled companies are often in a good position to take a long-term view of the company's prospects 166 and to ignore the market noise arising from short-term fluctuations in share prices. 167 Furthermore, some studies have suggested that family-owned and controlled companies in the region may have better and more sustainable stakeholder relationships. Rather than simply transactional counterparts, stakeholders are viewed by such companies as resources from a resource-dependency point of view. 168 There is also empirical research 169 which claims that family-owned and controlled companies have weathered crises better, showing less negative performance and more resilient returns on equity compared to companies with other ownership structures.
C. Minority Shareholder Protection in the Hong Kong Listing Regime
The minority shareholder protection regimes in Hong Kong are found in company law, and listing rules pertaining to disclosure and corporate governance standards. The listing regime of the SEHK includes a corporate governance code which applies to issuers on a comply-orexplain basis. 219 The Listing Rules prescribe the information that needs to be circulated to shareholders, including the advice of an independent financial adviser. 220 The independent shareholders are defined as being not connected persons or persons not having a material interest in the connected transaction in question. 221 We observe a coincidence in the rise in the importance of corporate governance standards in Hong Kong with the rise in foreign institutional ownership of Hong Kong listed equity. This seems to suggest that foreign minority shareholders regard corporate governance standards 212 Para C.3.8, above. 213 Para C.1.6, above. The SEHK and SFC seem determined to maintain the level of minority shareholder protection framed by corporate governance standards as well as the 'branding' appeal achieved by the institution of these standards. The determination of the SEHK and SFC not to water down corporate governance standards was particularly apparent in the recent episode involving the proposed flotation of Alibaba.com in Hong Kong.
229
The loss of Alibaba.com's potential listing in Hong Kong due to a failure to agree on an acceptable governance structure between issuer and regulator has caused fury in the investment and professional services industries due to the loss of fee revenues such flotation would have generated. SEHK in response has decided to consult on the way forward for its corporate governance standards. 230 However, institutional investors are firmly supportive 231 of maintaining existing standards. The buy-side in Hong Kong will be crucial in sustaining a level of minority shareholder protection characterised by wellaccepted ex ante corporate governance standards.
In this brief study of the Hong Kong listing regime, we observe that traditional 'law in the books' valued by La Porta et al (in research dating back almost 15 years), i.e. in the areas of company law rights, do not seem to be the places where minority shareholders find their protection being realised. Securities regulation has since the advent of the Securities and Futures Ordinance and increased empowerment of the SFC 232 been more relevant to investor protection in (a) sustaining corporate disclosure obligations; (b) cracking down against market abuse and (c) introducing corporate governance standards as part of the listing regime. The rise of foreign institutional ownership of Hong Kong listed equity seems to have exerted significant influence upon reforms in regulatory enforcement against insider dealing and the development of corporate governance standards in listing rules.
Minority expropriation problems have been a long-running feature in the block-held corporate economy in Hong Kong, but it is interesting to observe that the SEHK has adopted 229 Alibaba.com, one of China's largest e-commerce business, is planning to list on the New York Stock
Exchange in late-2014 in one of the largest initial public offers in the world, at US$20 billion. It reportedly sought an exemption from the SEHK from the one-third rule with regard to appointing independent directors and wished to institute a system whereby the founding shareholders, in a partnership structure, would have the exclusive rights to appoint directors. The exemption was rejected by the HK listing authorities. Since then, Alibaba.com has expressed its intention to list on a US exchange which allows dual-class share structures. both the strategies of adhering to generic best standards as well as tailor-made rules. The key generic best practice adopted is in ensuring the quantity and quality of independent directors on Boards. It seems that even in the predominantly block-held landscape in Hong Kong, similar standards are seen as applicable in mitigating the principal-principal agency problems.
However, it is important that the development of such standards is not a matter of mere transplantation but is considered within the unique business contexts, and pros and cons of block-held governance structures in Hong Kong. That said, unique Hong Kong solutions in providing for minority shareholder rights such as in notifiable and connected transactions have arguably been developed in a way sensitive to the Hong Kong market. Further, blockholder expropriation is mitigated by making voting by poll mandatory and requiring independent shareholder approval of connected transactions.
D. Final Observations and Conclusions
Our review of three major listing regimes suggests that minority shareholder protection frameworks are vibrant and evolving, but company law regimes have become less relevant to such frameworks compared to developments in securities regulation. Company law frameworks for minority shareholder protection in the UK and Hong Kong are well regarded in terms of anti-director rights and shareholder powers, but civil enforcement is largely illusory. In the US, minority shareholder powers are comparatively weak and Delaware company law in particular is significantly pro-director.
However, these relative strengths and weaknesses in company law frameworks have not affected stock market development pronouncedly. The US and UK remain the favourite investor destinations for listed equity 233 and Hong Kong is a very vibrant market in the AsiaPacific. 234 It may be argued that 'company law' does not matter, or does not matter significantly. A more optimistic interpretation is that the company law frameworks continue to support a minimum branding appeal even if there is negligible investor reliance on them.
Securities regulation regimes in all three jurisdictions have become more important than company law for developing minority shareholder protection. In particular, all three jurisdictions are broadly convergent along high standards of corporate transparency, timely disclosure and regulatory enforcement for maintaining market fairness and efficiency. In addition, there is a tradition of vibrant private securities litigation in the US 235 which can be employed against failings in corporate disclosure and insider dealing. There is also a marked increase in enforcement against insider dealing by authorities in the US, 236 UK and Hong
Kong. The prospect of fair and efficient exit on stock markets seems to be important to institutional investors, and we conclude that 'securities regulation matters' to the appeal and branding of a listing regime. In global securities markets, investor protection is increasingly regarded as a public good provided in securities regulation instead of contractarian arrangements-a fundamental conception that still underlies company law- 237 A key finding from our study is the increased importance of corporate governance standards, developed as part of the framework of listing rules (and arguably securities regulation), in all three jurisdictions. A mixture of reasons explains the appeal of corporate governance standards -particularly their potential to provide ex ante oversight of corporate behaviour ('defensive' reasons) and as a means of facilitating shareholder engagement and activism ('offensive' reasons). 238 Corporate governance standards can be adopted as law, such as in the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, 239 or more usually in listing rules that are contractually mandatory for listed issuers, 240 but not treated as part of regulatory law. We observe that corporate governance standards developed in all three jurisdictions have tended to become more prescriptive over time. 241 This trend raises the question as to the legal nature of listing rules 242 and the long-term prospects for soft law approaches to corporate governance, 243 as corporate governance standards become increasingly integral to modern securities regulation. There seems to be a significant buy-side underpinning of greater prescription. 244 Global assets under management total $64 trillion according to a survey carried out by Price Waterhouse Coopers 245 and are forecast to swell to $102 trillion by 2020. Global assets under management will increasingly dwarf any individual country's GDP and the investment management sector is increasingly powerful in influencing the terms upon which investments are made, including in equity and securities markets. Demands for robustly implemented governance standards in listed issuers are one manifestation of institutional investors' preferences and these will likely grow. 246 Broad patterns of international convergence can be found in corporate governance standards that address the agency problem of overly-powerful management in widely-held companies.. 247 In particular, independent Board representation has become a key building 243 This is a question the authors are highly interested in exploring in but will not do so here due to constraints of space. 244 J P Hawley and A T Williams, 'Shifting Ground: Emerging Global Corporate-Governance Standards and the block in corporate governance standards. Such convergence is arguably driven by the dominant influence of the Anglo-American institutional fund management sector.
248
Empirical literature has measured convergence in corporate governance standards internationally and records that notable convergence has taken place in standards that are particularly valued for minority shareholder protection. 249 However, regional fragmentations in corporate governance standards 250 show that the dialectics of contention between issuers, investors and policy-makers will continue to sustain some of the unique differences in corporate governance standards upheld in each securities market. 251 What standards ought to be employed to deal with the governance issues of blockholdercontrolled companies is still very much a developing issue, despite the fact that the majority of companies in the world are block-held rather than widely held. 252 The dynamic growth in the corporate sector in many emerging economies will bring more block-held companies to the world stage. 253 Many of these companies will have evolved out of state ownership or 248 Earlier literature on convergence driven by institutions are more broad-brush and optimistic, see Michael family ownership 254 , and will wish to gain exposure to global equity markets. The buy-side with rising global assets under management will also feel increasingly pressured to find opportunities for investment and yield. Regulators will have to respond to the accelerating collision of these two very different business cultures.
The slowness to-date in developing standards for block-held companies is probably due to the dominance of Anglo-American corporate governance frameworks based on the widelyheld structure. Such an unrepresentative but dominant view of corporate governance is arguably sustained (a) ideologically and academically in the finance perspective of economies featuring many widely-held large corporations, and (b) by institutional demands, notably those made by Western institutions and asset managers used to corporate governance standards in dispersed ownership economies.
Dealing with the unfortunate experiences of ENRC, Bumi and Essar Energy has given the FCA the opportunity to determine what corporate governance standards should be introduced in order to deal with blockholder-controlled companies and whether soft law is the appropriate medium. The introduction of the Enhanced Listing Regime is measured and incremental in nature. Perhaps tailored and more prescriptive governance standards may be more appropriate for block-held structures. 255 By partitioning a separate Regime for issuers with controlling shareholders, the FCA has arguably rejected a one-size-fits-all approach in setting corporate governance standards by catering for the unique needs of minority shareholders in block-held companies. In this way, the overall status and nature of the UK Corporate Governance Code is also maintained for the dominant quarter of widely-held companies in the equity market. We support this approach, and would not favour any wholesale shift towards integrating or harmonising corporate governance standards across all ownership structures and market sectors or the over-standardisation of corporate governance through regulation.
Negative perceptions of block-held companies have not emerged to the same extent in the US, which appears comfortable, for now, with the blockholder-dominated control structures of some of its most successful technology companies. In contrast, Hong Kong has long been aware of the dangers of blockholder expropriation, given the prevalence of concentrated ownership in its domestic issuers, with the result that it already incorporates a range of shareholders powers (related to significant and related party transactions) in its listing rules. The UK's Enhanced Listing Regime should be viewed as a pioneering but experimental framework. Our hope is that as it evolves, policy makers will take a balanced view of the pros and cons of block-held structures. 256 The governance fiascos of Bumi, ENRC and Essar
Energy have been a painful experience for the UK equity market. But we hope that they will not blind the UK to the benefits of an ownership structure which, in an appropriate institutional context, can offer economic opportunities as well as risks. 
